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Planning’s End? Urban Renewal in New Haven, the Yale School of Art and Architecture, and the Fall of the New Deal Spatial Order

Brian Goldstein

Abstract
This article argues that the movement against urban renewal emerged not only in the streets of American cities, but also in the halls of American universities. In response to the extensive redevelopment of New Haven in the 1950s and 1960s, students at the Yale School of Art and Architecture, and especially in the Department of City Planning, marshaled an extensive critique of their expanding university’s role in this top-down reconstruction. In the plight of impacted communities they found a parallel to their own frustrations as students. Envisioning a more “relevant” design pedagogy that deemphasized the role of the professional and lent greater power to the grassroots, students forced the hand of Yale president Kingman Brewster, Jr., who sought to protect the expertise and bureaucratic process he viewed as essential to liberalism. In their confrontation lay a fundamental shift in the order of urban redevelopment—and thus in the order of the modern city—in the last years of the 1960s.

Keywords
urban renewal; urban planning; race; liberalism; student movements

Students from the Yale School of Art and Architecture, joined by their peers from Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania, MIT, and Harvard, led a dramatic walkout from the New England regional conference of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) on November 8, 1968. “The AIA has helped develop a professional aesthetic unrelated to the real needs of people that permits sociologically disastrous housing projects and racist universities to be built,” students and sympathetic faculty read aloud, interrupting the conference chairman’s opening remarks. “We believe architects must begin to realize they are socially responsible for their actions, that by designing buildings for oppressive institutions, they reinforce those institutions.” The protesters continued with an attack directed against those who would design cities from the top down. “We

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believe the architect must no longer be responsible only to the industrial and political powers . . . but to the users, the people who inhabit the environment," they read. “The architects cannot . . . remain aloof from people and communities, afraid to acknowledge that other men also know something about their environment, and afraid to lessen their professional distance and learn from the users.”

Though their attack took attendees by surprise, the Yale-led contingent’s orchestrated happening had deep roots, for radical design students had been developing a critique of their future professions throughout the later 1960s. Instead of ameliorating the social costs of war, inequality, or racism, students came to believe that designers had become instruments of each. “A feeling grew . . . that the architectural profession as practiced and defined by the AIA [had] become irrelevant to the needs of society and a dangerous tool of oppression in this country,” said Henry Stone, a leader of the walkout. In the eyes of radical design students, no realm embodied the disconnection between professional practice and social responsibility more than urban renewal, the postwar redevelopment project in which their own universities were key partners. Yale students, in particular, searching for modernist urban design to condemn, had only to look around—to the expanding fringes of their campus and to the recently redeveloped streets of their adopted home, New Haven, Connecticut.

Although Yale president Kingman Brewster, Jr. had protested in 1967 that “Yale cannot solve the problems of New Haven nor can it be its banker or redeveloper,” his refusal belied the truly close relationship between Woodbridge Hall—from where the university’s presidents ruled—and New Haven’s City Hall, a symbiotic collaboration that had reshaped both New Haven and Yale over the previous two decades. Indeed, the university had served precisely in the role of “redeveloper” throughout the urban renewal period by supporting the city with political and design talent, institutional collaboration, and its own physical expansion into surrounding neighborhoods, a consumption of space complicit with the city’s ambitious agenda. With Yale’s help, New Haven had pursued a redevelopment strategy consisting of land clearance and new construction, an approach that had first emerged during the New Deal era and grew in strength with the Housing Act of 1949, the legislation that authorized federally supported urban renewal. This “New Deal spatial order” brought the faith in government-administered social welfare, elite expertise, and capitalistic progress that characterized modern liberalism into the realm of the built environment, yielding new, government-sponsored, modernistic developments nationwide.

The New Deal spatial order persisted long after the New Deal itself, even as urban renewal evolved. Redevelopment became more nuanced after passage of the Housing Act of 1954 enabled rehabilitation instead of total clearance, but the federal largesse that facilitated the wholesale redevelopment projects for which urban renewal was best known did not begin to trickle into cities until the mid to late 1950s. In other words, even as New Haven pioneered a comprehensive approach to urban development—including rent subsidies as an alternative to public housing, rehabilitation of thousands of homes, and innovative social service programs, all of which helped the Elm City earn its new nickname of “model city”—New Haven kept building the massive redevelopment projects that literally changed its face. In the late 1960s, as President Johnson introduced his Great Society social programs, New Haven officials proudly unveiled a massive commercial complex bordering the city’s Green and new office and residential towers throughout downtown. In New Haven, the worst excesses of the New Deal spatial order remained the most visible characteristics of its redevelopment, even as the innovations of Great Society liberalism promised a more subtle approach to improving the urban crisis.

Just as activists assailed the top-down governance that endured amid political reforms of the late 1960s, so too did they attack the persistent vestiges of the New Deal spatial order. Civil rights battles and frustrations with state bureaucracy affected not only politics but the built
environment as well. Amid the ferment of the decade, New Haven, like many other cities with similarly aggressive urban renewal programs, met vehement opposition to its redevelopment agenda in legislative chambers and in the streets. Yet while such public battles have attracted increasing attention from historians concerned with the changing nature of urban design in the 1960s, their work has overlooked the important debates that took place within another major realm of contestation during this turbulent decade—the university. Historians have extensively documented the ways that universities politically and financially supported the growth of urban renewal in its first decades, but the story of Yale in the late 1960s suggests that the university also became a vital incubator for the activism that contributed to urban renewal’s downfall. This history offers an alternative to familiar narratives that place the business leaders, institutions, and politicians who constituted “prorowth coalitions” on one side of the struggle over the future of urban redevelopment and the citizen activists of the “community revolution” on the other. Such a dichotomy oversimplifies the poles of the debate, neglecting the crucial role of protest by the next generation of architects and planners from within the very institutions that had so actively supported redevelopment.

Students at Yale’s School of Art and Architecture resisted what they considered an authoritarian mode of urban design that seemed increasingly obsolete both as it was taught and as it was practiced. Like their colleagues nationwide, they demanded pedagogical changes that would help to foster greater engagement with the people whom architects and planners served. Yale provides an especially rich context in which to examine such mobilization, for it offered at one site the convergence of a leading design school, an active student movement, and the country’s most exemplary urban redevelopment program. Design students frustrated with their education had only to look out the window to find inspiration in the social protests of fellow students and increasing unrest among their neighbors in the “model city.” Channeling the themes of the New Left, architecture and planning students at Yale called for greater engagement with their community, racial diversity in their profession, influence in university planning, and increased involvement in university governance. They pursued planning’s redirection, demanding a more “relevant” profession couched in the real problems that cities faced. Their story demonstrates that student movements were concerned not only with protest against the Vietnam War or political exclusion but also with space itself, which design students viewed as a terrain in which equality could be undermined or achieved. We invite all architects, city-planners, draftsmen, engineers and others connected to the profession to . . . bring architecture into the Movement,” wrote members of the Architects’ Resistance, the group founded by those who had led the AIA walkout.

Though the New Left, broadly construed, never achieved many of the idealistic aims that it sought, the battles fought over urban space at Yale suggest one realm in which radical students did attain some measure of their vision, even if it came at great cost. Yale’s administration tolerated expressions of dissent until they threatened the liberal tenets on which the New Deal spatial order fundamentally rested—especially the role of the professional expert—at which point Brewster responded dramatically. In the late spring of 1969, in response to a governance crisis in the Department of City Planning prompted by student activism, Brewster effectively shut down the department—a state that has remained to the present day. Yet Brewster’s drastic action ultimately marked not planning’s end but a crucial moment in its evolution. While students at Yale lost the platform from which they had agitated, they left to find that their profession had endured, and in a form shaped—at least on its surface—by their activism. Yale’s School of Art and Architecture stood as only one site in a vast professional debate that dominated architecture and planning in the late 1960s, but the battles that took place in its halls and studios reveal much about the crucial role that radical design students played in the transformation of the discipline—and the American city.
Yale University: New Haven’s Partner in Urban Redevelopment

“The American dream of a slumless city may be fulfilled here,” the New York Times proclaimed in an assessment of New Haven’s redevelopment program in September 1965. Indeed, as the article detailed, one-third of New Haven was to be redeveloped under plans that encompassed half a billion dollars in total investment. New Haven boasted the highest per capita federal urban renewal expenditure in the country, a remarkable $458 per person—exceeding New York City’s per capita figure by $427. New Haven’s pursuit of urban renewal was so vast, in fact, that its total federal grants failed to surpass only those of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, metropolises that dwarfed the Connecticut city in size and population. Three projects typified the range of approaches and neighborhoods that New Haven urban renewal encompassed. Along the city’s landmark Green, officials pursued a strategy intended to reassert downtown’s commercial primacy against new suburban threats. The Church Street Redevelopment project included a massive sculptured concrete parking garage, new Malley’s and Macy’s department stores, small shops, and the Park Plaza hotel, a black glass monolith that opened in 1966. Immediately south of downtown, the city cleared the dense, forty-two-acre Oak Street neighborhood to construct a highway intended to ease access to the city’s commercial core. By the late 1960s, a series of iconic residential, institutional, and commercial buildings flanked the new Oak Street Connector, turning the road into a showcase of the city’s most dramatic redevelopment projects. And in the Wooster Square neighborhood, officials built a new school, library, and community center on a dormant site and rehabilitated a thousand homes (even as they cleared many more). As the city shifted its population in massive strokes, leaders expressed an enthusiasm for urban renewal unmatched in any other American city. “We are restoring an elegance and grace to this city,” Mayor Richard C. Lee told the New York Times reporter. “And it’s fun, exciting to think what can be done.”

As New Haven became the country’s leading practitioner of redevelopment, no institution supported its efforts more than Yale University. The city–university partnership reached back even before the formation of New Haven’s Redevelopment Agency in 1950. Yale professor Maurice Rotival had designed the city’s master plan in the early 1940s, a vision that he revisited again in the early 1950s, proposing a city enmeshed in a network of local and regional highways. Mayor Lee, whose sixteen-year tenure bracketed the urban renewal era from 1954 to 1970, had previously served as head of Yale’s public relations office. Edward Logue, the administrator of the New Haven Redevelopment Agency during its most active period from 1954 to 1960, boasted degrees from Yale College and Yale Law School. Yale participated in New Haven’s reconstruction not only as a supplier of human resources but also as an active collaborator. Brewster’s predecessor, Yale president Whitney Griswold, served as vice chair of one of the city’s major redevelopment advocates, the Citizens Action Commission, beginning in 1954, and Brewster would later serve the same role. Behind the scenes, the university helped attract federal monies to New Haven, both by its prominence and by its political connections, building a university–city alliance that benefited the interests of both entities.

Yale’s most important contribution to New Haven, however, came through its expansion, which often explicitly accommodated the city’s redevelopment goals. Yale’s new Laboratory of Epidemiology and Public Health, designed by architect Philip Johnson and completed in 1964, stood as one of the distinctive new towers along the Oak Street Connector. In 1962, the university expanded its northeast boundary to accommodate two new residential colleges designed by architect Eero Saarinen—Morse and Stiles—in the city’s Dixwell Renewal Area, on a site that held three high schools and residences that the city willingly cleared on Yale’s behalf. Most emblematic of this collaboration was the university’s new Art and Architecture (A & A) Building, which opened to great fanfare in 1963. Designed by Paul Rudolph, head of the university’s
architecture program in the late 1950s and early 1960s and a frequent collaborator on redevelopment projects throughout the city, the A & A Building was one component of the city’s Dwight Renewal Area. Its intricate concrete and glass form marked the apogee of Yale’s turn toward modernism under Griswold, a turn that found the university adopting spatial forms and practices that mirrored those of the city.

Griswold’s building campaign, which left the university’s neo-Gothic past in the dust, embraced a faith in total clearance and modern forms—a New Deal spatial order. Nowhere is this more evident than in a quick perusal of the considerable new construction that dotted the Yale campus in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Just three years after Griswold’s tenure began in 1950, the university opened an architecturally radical art gallery on Chapel Street, designed by Louis I. Kahn. Over the next fifteen years, Yale would unveil, in addition to the several buildings already mentioned, a new, Saarinen-designed ice hockey arena that resembled a Viking ship, new geology and chemistry laboratories on Yale’s Science Hill and an adjoining biology building that towered over campus, all designed by Johnson, Rudolph’s delicate glass forestry laboratory, and the Gordon Bunshaft–designed Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, a hermetic marble box situated in an austere plaza behind Woodbridge Hall. Each demonstrated a marked rejection of Yale’s traditional architectural style and a tabula rasa approach. As in New Haven’s own redevelopment, some projects explicitly replaced dense urban neighborhoods; even those that filled previously unbuilt land registered the gradual extension of Yale’s domain, block by modernist block.

Rejection of the New Deal Spatial Order

By the time Kingman Brewster succeeded Whitney Griswold as Yale’s president in the spring of 1964, a broad critique of urban renewal was already underway. Jane Jacobs had published The Death and Life of Great American Cities, her devastating indictment of top-down planning and paean to small-scale urbanism, in 1961. The next year, sociologist Herbert Gans published his own critique of modernist urban renewal, focusing on the destroyed West End neighborhood of Boston. Economist Martin Anderson would offer his assessment from the political right in 1964, arguing in The Federal Bulldozer that the federal government’s involvement in redevelopment had been misguided, ineffective, and wasteful. While these published works provided intellectual arguments against technocratic urban reconstruction, growing movements nationwide offered tangible evidence that the dream of a modernist city had failed to address society’s greatest problems at the grassroots level, too.

Indeed, New Haven was a hotbed of such activism. As early as October 1961, African American residents in the city’s Dixwell neighborhood, located just northwest of the Yale campus, protested their limited participation in a plan that was to replace much of their community with middle-income housing. That same month, activists held a “sit out” in the middle of Dixwell Avenue, filling the neighborhood’s primary corridor with one hundred citizens protesting redevelopment. Early resistance planted the seed for a stronger movement mid-decade, as residents in the Hill community pursued a more organized strategy under the auspices of the Hill Neighborhood Union in early 1965. While New Haven officials planned their imposition of modernist structures in the Hill neighborhood’s center and the construction of automobile-oriented roads, citizens held community meetings to organize Freedom Schools, rent strikes, community-designed housing, and—in an effort led by the Hill’s youngest residents—the construction of decent playground space. Such efforts, even if stymied or stalled, demonstrated increasing unwillingness to tolerate the neglect and domination that tended to follow New Haven’s redevelopment agenda, especially in the city’s African American neighborhoods.
The organization of the Hill community also marked the increasing presence in New Haven of student activists who followed the tactics and ideals of the New Left. Yale undergraduates collaborated closely with community members to create the Hill Neighborhood Union and, later, the activist Hill Parents’ Association. On campus, students confronted Yale’s administration in early 1965 to protest their decision to deny tenure to Richard Bernstein, a popular philosophy professor, a cause with local origins but national motivation, as activists drew inspiration from Berkeley’s recent Free Speech Movement and the southern civil rights movement. Likewise, anger over the Vietnam War fueled a Students for a Democratic Society–led campaign against the presence of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) on campus, an effort that spanned the latter half of the 1960s and mirrored similar assaults against ROTC nationwide. Although their anger found specific targets, fundamentally student activists from the left—“suspicious of ‘elitism’ and ‘bureaucracy’”—were expressing general frustrations with the bureaucratic, authoritarian political order that prevailed in this decade.

Just as ROTC brought the failures of the dominant political order to a level that students could comprehend and directly respond to, the built environment itself became a tangible expression of the failings of liberal policies, a physical reality that students could confront. Indeed, redevelopment frequently appeared as the setting around which campus conflicts ensued. Columbia University’s epic battles of April 1968, for example, which ended with the student occupation of five university buildings, marked the climax of mounting anger over several issues, including the proposed construction of a gymnasium in nearby Morningside Park. As the university’s official report of the events later noted, “The nub of the issue was that the community’s property was being used by a private institution. . . . Since the community affected was overwhelmingly black, this shortcoming symbolized all the injustices of both poverty and racism.” Similarly, students in Yale’s Departments of Architecture and City Planning—both programs that, not incidentally, were housed in the modernist A & A Building—came to focus on urban redevelopment as both a symbol and a cause of greater social ills, many of which could be seen just outside the perimeter of the Yale campus.

Radical students developed their critique of the New Deal spatial order amid a changing context in the Yale School of Art and Architecture. City planning had begun as a program in 1949 and became a department in 1960; architecture had begun much earlier, in 1913. According to Harry Wexler, a faculty member in city planning starting in 1963, the program faced two major transformations in its short history. During the 1950s, while dependent on the architecture department, city planning maintained a design focus. After the university created the independent Department of City Planning, however, chair Arthur Row lent it a “technocratic/administrative dimension.” Row had joined Yale’s faculty after completing Philadelphia’s Physical Development Plan in 1960, a comprehensive plan that called for broad redevelopment, including demolition of a quarter of the homes in the city. Under Row, Yale’s planning department expressed a similarly top-down approach to urban space. In 1962–1963, for example, students could take a course on “plan preparation” at the urban and regional scales or a course on land use emphasizing a “functional approach.” At this time, the Department of Architecture remained under the chairmanship of Paul Rudolph, the frequent redevelopment collaborator and Harvard-trained modernist.

The Department of City Planning adopted a “reform” emphasis once Christopher Tunnard became chair in 1966. Tunnard, a landscape architect who had been on Yale’s faculty since the 1950s, had impeccable modernist credentials, having joined Harvard’s Graduate School of Design faculty in 1939 just as the school was becoming a hotbed of European avant-garde émigrés. But Tunnard inherited a young faculty at Yale that pushed to change the curriculum upon Row’s departure. During his first years as chairman, Tunnard appointed several progressive planners, fashioning a curricular emphasis on “policy analysis, social change and clinical experience,”
according to Wexler. In the Department of Architecture, new chairman and early postmodernist Charles Moore managed a similar shift, moving the department toward a more experiential approach that offered courses outside the studio. Such curricular changes indexed broader trends in the disciplines of architecture and city planning, especially the increasing influence of advocacy planning, which offered a dramatic alternative to the top-down model that still predominated in New Haven’s City Hall.

Advocacy planning, as described by urban planner Paul Davidoff in his seminal 1965 article “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning,” grew out of his own experiences introducing activism into the planning curriculum at the University of Pennsylvania. “Planners should be able to engage in the political process as advocates of the interests both of government and of such other groups, organizations, or individuals who are concerned with proposing policies for the future development of the community,” Davidoff wrote. As an alternative to the ideal of the master builder, advocacy planning reserved a more modest role for the design profession, one informed by the specific social causes of the era, especially civil rights. The advocate planner served as an intermediary, offering professional expertise on behalf of interest groups instead of developing an all-encompassing plan from the top down. Yale courses offered in the late 1960s reflected such an emphasis: in 1967–1968 Yale planning students could take “Social Implications of Housing Policy,” taught by noted advocacy planner Chester Hartman, or join the “Newark Advocate Team,” an interdisciplinary studio that crafted an alternate plan and legal defense for an inner-city Newark community fighting a proposed urban renewal project. In 1968–1969, architecture students focused on a number of topics in the standard “Advanced Architectural Design” course, including advocacy planning, and planners could enroll in “Planners and Clients,” taught by influential advocacy planner C. Richard Hatch, and “Environment and Behavior,” a course focused on New Haven’s Hill neighborhood. No course marked the school’s shift more dramatically than Wexler’s “Planning and Political Decision Making,” a seminar that promised in 1968–1969 to assess “the various and often conflicting roles of the planner in the process of urban policy-making.” The previous year, Harold Wise had taught the same course with a considerably different flavor: students could expect “a seminar on the comprehensive plan and the instruments of development policy with particular emphasis on the making of development decisions by political bodies.” Indeed, Wise had been teaching such a course since 1963–1964, when it was titled “The Comprehensive Plan.” Such an evolution, from the absolutism of the plan and the authority of its planner to a consideration of the “conflicting roles” that planners faced, symbolized the broad change felt in the halls of A & A.

Students interested in the burgeoning advocacy planning movement could claim the support of their faculty and, in a sense, that of Yale President Brewster as well. While Brewster thoroughly embodied the liberal ideals of this era, and surrounded himself with such members of the “liberal establishment” as McGeorge Bundy, John Lindsay, and Cyrus Vance, he took a measured approach to the era in which he found himself. Indeed, Brewster’s inaugural address—with its call for greater engagement outside the university—seemed to anticipate the eventual emergence of advocacy planning at Yale. “We dare not admit that in order to be true to our University tradition we must seal the windows against all relevance to the real world,” said Brewster. “Indeed, in order to keep the business of learning itself uncorrupted it may be important to open the gates of the walled city more frequently for those who would sample experience.”

Brewster built a reputation during his tenure for patience amid the increasing turmoil of the era and a careful hand in response to student activism, a quality that contrasted greatly with the violent confrontations that marked Berkeley, Columbia, and, later, Harvard. Yet even as Brewster attempted to make space in his university for competing views, he maintained a fierce liberal faith in process and expertise. The 1965 student activism concerning the tenure case of philosophy professor Richard Bernstein underscored Brewster’s allegiance to bureaucratic procedure.
While he responded favorably to student protests regarding this issue, his solution to the conflict was to ask the involved department to vote again to clarify their initial decision. In Brewster’s words, “Ultimately the faculty must decide who the faculty shall be . . . appointments and promotions should not be made either by Presidential decree or by student ballot.”51 Similarly, while advocacy planning indeed posed an alternative to the New Deal spatial order, it nonetheless retained a primary role for the professional planner that aligned with Brewster’s bureaucratic expectations.

Within this rubric, Brewster could tolerate the dissent that increasingly emerged from the School of Art and Architecture in the late 1960s. By this time, a general—and serious—distaste for the formal and social remove of modernist urban design was apparent among vocal architecture and planning students. Like their New Left colleagues, frustrated design students pursued what historian Doug Rossinow has called a “search for authenticity,” especially an engagement with the “real,” throughout the mid-1960s.52 They sought practical design experience in the same low-income communities where other New Left activists pursued community organizing. Beginning in 1966, architecture students volunteered in rural Kentucky, where they constructed community buildings and homes for impoverished residents. Pat Goeters, a former student in the master’s in urban studies program and a faculty member, helped found Group Nine, a collective that worked in Knox County, Kentucky, during the 1966–1967 school year, planning housing for families displaced by a dam.53 Goeters also organized the Newark Advocate Team, which assisted a Yale Law School student who had volunteered with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democratic Society and led the campaign against a plan to build a 150-acre medical school campus in Newark’s poorest neighborhood.54 Colin “Topper” Carew, a faculty member as well as a student at Yale, also encouraged the growing activist spirit in the school. He had volunteered with SNCC in Maryland and Mississippi before founding the New Thing Art and Architecture Center in Washington, D.C., in 1967. The New Thing offered art, performance, and writing courses to Washington’s African American community and hosted an advocacy-oriented community design studio.55

It was in Carew’s urban design seminar, taught in the fall of 1968, that Henry Stone and his fellow Yale students turned the professional critique implicit in these alternative design practices into an explicit critique directed against architecture’s major professional organization—the AIA. As Stone wrote, “[A]n act of censorship (the walkout) was planned to repudiate the Institute and its goals, and an alternative conference set up that we might start to redefine the profession for ourselves.”56 At the AIA conference in November 1968, students emphasized the distance between the preoccupations of designers and the real problems of cities like New Haven. “The AIA seems to embody a lack of an honest concern for people, and is symptomatic of the failure of the profession as a whole to demonstrate this concern,” they announced to the assembled architects. “We believe that whatever consensus is reached here or anywhere by professionals is unjust and meaningless without real and equal participation of those affected by decisions.”57 Their act was rich with symbolism; not only did students bring the guerrilla tactics of the New Left into the heart of their chosen profession, but in walking out of the conference venue—the Park Plaza hotel, a key component of New Haven’s Church Street Redevelopment project—they enacted in physical terms the rejection of the New Deal spatial order that they had just vocalized.

Following their powerful critique, participants gathered at the Enormous Room, a student-run coffee shop on campus, where invited speakers presented an alternative professional vision predicated on advocacy planning and community involvement. Harris Stone, a New Haven architect (unrelated to Henry Stone) who had worked at the New Haven Redevelopment Agency, read “a harsh criticism” of the agency to the assembled group. Robert Goodman, an activist planner, discussed Urban Planning Aid, a renowned Boston advocacy planning group, while a member of the Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem discussed “the role of the white architect in aiding
the black community.” Carew discussed the New Thing and the importance of cultural nationalism. The group adopted a statement that combined the broad concerns of the New Left with their specific critique of urban renewal. Participants promised that their “only responsibility is to the people who use the environment” and to “only use their skills as tools for liberating oppressed peoples.” They vowed to “work against such U.S. activities as the war in Southeast Asia, or any imperialist or racist exploitation at home or abroad” and “against those who exploit people and land for their own power and profit.”

In light of the liberationist terms in which walkout participants framed their manifesto, it was fateful that just a month later Yale planning students met with Robert Moses, New York’s urban renewal czar and a towering symbol of redevelopment zeal, when he visited New Haven. The Yale Daily News, channeling both the spirit of the times and the impression left by the meeting, noted, “Moses represented to [the students] an era of planning in which small groups of influential men were able to ram projects down the throats of a neighborhood or a city, without considering the impact on the community or the individuals involved.” Moses, fulfilling the role of villain, dismissed participatory planning and citizen participation. “I think that’s just a doctrinaire thing that doesn’t mean anything,” he said. He acknowledged that he did not consider displacement his concern and lauded Co-op City, the massive modernist housing development for fifty thousand residents recently begun in the Bronx. Students made their feelings about such projects plain. “For many of the students present, the project was an example of the bleak, inhuman, uninhabitable masses of stone, the products of a society so distorted in its values that it can offer nothing but ugliness to its less fortunate members,” the Daily News noted.

While the AIA and Robert Moses stood as relatively easy targets for critique, crucial to students’ reaction against the New Deal spatial order was the realization that their own institution—Yale University—represented this order as well. Students specifically focused on the university’s expansion, an ambitious program that, as we have seen, left austere monuments scattered throughout the campus. The very buildings that had spelled Yale’s modernization now became symbols of the failures of modernism, emblematic of a growing feeling that Yale had turned its back on the city it called home, that the university’s thirst for land had contributed to New Haven’s increasing urban crisis. The Yale Daily News, in an article alarmingly titled “City Fears University Expansion,” noted that the university’s land holdings encompassed 35 percent of the tax-exempt property in New Haven, a sum that could have provided $5.6 million to the troubled city. The editors of Novum Organum, a broadsheet produced by students in the School of Art and Architecture, satirized the iconic A & A Building with a series of bathroom stall drawings published in their third issue and asked “Whitney Griswold, A Great Builder?” in their fourth issue, a number that scrutinized Yale’s modernist legacy.

Design students’ concerns not only were retrospective but also encompassed Brewster’s own efforts to continue Griswold’s building project. A controversy had erupted during the 1967–1968 school year around plans to extend Sterling Memorial Library underneath Cross Campus, Yale’s major spine, since above-ground designs would have marred this historic space. In late 1968, as students continued to question designs for the Cross Campus Library and the university began planning the Mellon Gallery, a new British art museum intended to clear a large, inhabited site near the A & A Building, students attacked the aloofness they perceived in Yale’s approach. Before a meeting with Yale planning consultant Edward Larrabee Barnes, two architecture students—Herbert Short and Manfred Ibel—led the charge against university planning, promising a “confrontation in which the students will show they are not willing to tolerate any more of the dishonesty or bad planning at Yale.” That they linked the university’s approach to the authoritarianism of the New Deal spatial order became abundantly clear in the comments they circulated before the meeting, arguing that “Yale’s feudal approach to administration cannot solve today’s planning problems.” “Why is there all the secrecy about Yale’s expansion plans?” students
Relevance and Participation

Just as Yale design students lamented the top-down framework of urban renewal and its implications for affected residents, they came to view their own exclusion from the university’s planning process in similar terms. In response to the meeting with Barnes, Short wrote, “In campus planning, the student is the ultimate client. The campus exists to fulfill his need for social space, for study space, for housing. He is the client; yet who will represent him to the planner or the architect if he doesn’t. No one!” Such an attitude suggested the broader shift occurring in the halls of the A & A Building. By early 1969, radical design students had seen ample evidence that the Great Society’s response to the urban crisis had not changed the fundamental spatial order of urban redevelopment. President Lyndon Johnson’s most significant urban renewal innovation—Model Cities—had promised greater local control, but communities that sought power over Model Cities funding, like New Haven’s Hill neighborhood, met considerable resistance from redevelopment officials and gained no lasting victories. In early 1969, the Nixon administration returned control over Model Cities to city governments and New Haven officials turned their attention back to massive downtown projects, including a new coliseum and the Knights of Columbus Building. As historian Robert Self has argued, the failure of Great Society liberalism to enact substantial change prompted demands for self-determination from the radical left, a shift evinced in the realm of civil rights by the rise of Black Power and in the realm of the
built environment by a push beyond advocacy planning. While advocacy planning offered a promising alternative to the predominant New Deal spatial order, it retained a central role for the professional—as empathetic intermediary—that for many activists still seemed too distant from urban residents. Amid persistent social inequality, students increasingly demanded a planning framework in which the planned-for played a role closer to that of the planner, without intermediaries. Pat Goeters made this shift clear in his remarks to Barnes: “If there are some who are making judgments for others this by itself is evidence that there are some whose power to make their own judgments has been co-opted or stolen.”

In January 1969, Short and Ibel tested this democratic ideology in their proposal for the “Yale Planning Forum,” an organization intended to institutionalize student involvement in the campus planning process. They suggested to Brewster their “interest in demonstrating the possibility of disciplined, constructive community involvement in planning.” Their proposal argued that “a way must be found for people who live in and around the Yale campus to become contributors to the process of designing that campus.” They advocated direct communication with the Yale community, a workshop facilitating design input on projects, and a community committee to provide criticism. Brewster’s response defined the terms in which he would accept student participation. Community-wide involvement did not meet the administration’s test; in the words of Yale’s wary director of Buildings and Grounds Planning, “it could develop a lot of unchanneled student ideas.” To design students wishing to have their say about Yale’s planning, Brewster offered a new course in the School of Architecture, one that Howard Weaver, the school’s dean, explained, “will incorporate a chance to cope not with simulated problems but with real situations in the company of professionals.” Such a scenario accommodated the administration’s bureaucratic faith, meeting “the challenge . . . to extend the educational process without pretending that it is not an educational process.”

Indeed, even as the administration reiterated its faith in the educational process, students in the School of Art and Architecture fixed on that process as an embodiment of the New Deal spatial order they disdained. Just as students compared their own lack of involvement in Yale’s expansion to the New Haven community’s lack of involvement in redevelopment, they linked the pedagogical emphases and top-down governance of design education to the modernist approach to urban redevelopment. Architecture and planning professional schools formed the farm teams for the profession at large, defining the terms of practice through the mode of education. Thus, students demanded a more “relevant” form of design education, one that further reduced the role of the professional to lend greater power to involved communities.

Such a goal motivated the Black Workshop, an interdisciplinary group that became a central activist presence in the Yale School of Art and Architecture. The Workshop, formed by ten African American design students in late 1968, offered a radical alternative to the traditional Yale design education. Members, like their activist peers, sought to restore design’s social orientation. As they wrote in a founding document, “We have found that at present Black architectural and planning students are not educated sufficiently to cope with problems relevant to their community’s needs, but rather in ‘traditional’ establishment, personal, monumental architecture.” But unlike their white classmates, the concerns of Workshop members grew uniquely from their experience as victims of the practices they condemned. As Richard Dozier, an architecture student and director of the Black Workshop, remembered, “Yale was planning a ring road that threatened the communities in which we lived. We were at Yale but we lived in the community, and our homes were being destroyed. For these kinds of reasons we established the Yale Black Workshop.”

Frustrated with both the means and the ends of typical modern design pedagogy, Black Workshop members tapped the ideology of racial nationalism and community control that was transforming the civil rights movement at this time. “We . . . think that the local community should design and control its own destiny. We think that the Black community and other disadvantaged
communities must have their own doctors, architects, lawyers, teachers, planners, etc., to serve their particular needs,” they argued.77

To bring design into the hands of New Haven’s black community, Black Workshop members proposed “a completely new educational process for architects and planners” that subverted many of the administrative conventions typical at any university, especially the prominence of elite expertise. For example, they demanded a work program centered on “services needed as defined by the community,” degree credit for Workshop projects, and evaluation conducted by both faculty advisors and members of the community they served.78 Members took the classroom to the streets, assisting public housing tenants at the Elm Haven project with rehabilitation plans and training residents in the Fair Haven neighborhood to inspect houses and enforce codes.79 They battled with Yale to define the place of the Black Workshop within the university; in their view, the Workshop was an “extension school,” an “outside school within the university” that offered practical experience to African American design students. Such a seemingly minor detail bore great significance, for Workshop members tied the status of their program within Yale to the university’s position in the broader New Haven community. “This to us and the Black Community of New Haven is a direct refusal by the University to allot the proper portion of its resources to the community,” members wrote Dean Weaver regarding their perception that the university viewed the workshop as a “separate school.”80

Black Workshop members articulated an increasingly prominent role for community members within the daily work of their program. They aimed to teach planning and design not only to design students but also to New Haven residents. “We shall set up training programs to teach community people plan reading and planning decision making,” the Black Workshop proposed. “We will also introduce a sub-level workshop to train and stimulate interested people in architecture.” Broadening the definition of the planner would allow a new level of “self determination,” with “the people . . . able to be a real part of the planning process as they will do the planning themselves.” Later in 1969, members of the Black Workshop would even propose an intern program for community members interested in urbanism, one that would offer an associate’s degree in planning, architecture, or graphic design upon completion.81

Literally changing the “face” of planning and architecture constituted a major objective of Black Workshop members. In their view, black representation tied directly to the ability to help predominantly African American urban communities. Dozier argued, “The University commitment had to go beyond the admission of a few black students if they were truly concerned about the ‘urban problem.’”82 Indeed, admissions and departmental governance in general became major causes for activist design students, who compared the top-down administration of their departments with the same tendency in the New Deal spatial order. Student Charles Korn, in a Novum Organum article in early 1969, made this connection explicit. “Until now the City Planning Department has not practiced in relation to students the very courtesies which are mandated by law upon practitioners of City Planning, viz. Notification, Participation, etc. Parallels of the evils of urban renewal and the too familiar tragedies of city planning become painfully clear at meetings of the Yale City Planning Faculty and Students,” he wrote.83 Architecture students especially felt that they had no control over the composition of what they saw as a “mediocre” faculty, while all design students complained of irrelevant coursework and a general lack of power.84

Addressing the lack of voice among New Haven communities affected by redevelopment, radical design students proposed putting power back in the hands of the neighborhood. Likewise, in confronting their own subordinate role in the School of Art and Architecture, students demanded an analogous participatory model in which they could confront the deficiencies they perceived in the liberal Yale administration. It is here that the fates of architecture and planning students began to diverge, for while their interests largely cohered in this period, their
departments maintained separate faculties and administrations. In chairman Charles Moore, architecture students found a sympathetic leader, but one who largely channeled student voices into semiofficial bodies such as the “Committee of Eight,” a student group with which he met occasionally. Planning students, however, belonged to a far smaller department where several faculty members shared their rejection of the dominant spatial order. Tunnard, Goeters, and Wexler may not have always agreed with the means radical students adopted, but they were willing to support educational experiments meant to address planning’s insufficiencies.

In February 1969, students and faculty in the Department of City Planning formed a new governance committee. The City Planning Forum consisted of all appointed faculty and all students studying toward masters’ of city planning and masters’ of urban studies degrees. As outlined in their “Rules and Bylaws,” this body held authority over budget, faculty recruitment and assessment, curriculum, and admissions. Student and faculty votes counted equally, and the department chair agreed to support any decision voted by the Forum. Behind such a radically different ruling structure stood a new attitude toward planning hierarchy in general. As the bylaws stated, “Participation by students and faculty in the process of planning and operating the Department is especially relevant to the professional training of planners.”

The City Planning Forum soon joined the Black Workshop in the cause of student diversity. Since its formation, the Workshop had battled with the School of Art and Architecture’s administration over financial aid for minority students and its role in minority recruiting. In March 1969, the Forum agreed to support the Black Workshop’s recommendations for minority candidates in the 1969–1970 city planning class. Like the Workshop, the City Planning Forum felt that racial diversity played an essential role in successful planning. “Professional practice in City Planning deals in large part with the renewal of Black inner city areas. Too few Black professionals are involved,” Forum members noted. So Forum members divided their admissions decisions into two pools—an April pool including general admissions and a May pool including the Black Workshop suggestions—allowing Workshop members sufficient time to complete recruitment. April admissions passed without incident. In late April, the Black Workshop submitted its recommendations to the City Planning Forum, which by that time knew that seven white students and one African American student had already accepted admissions offers. Forum members decided to accept twelve more students despite the administration’s decision to allow only fourteen total, a number smaller than in previous years, disregarding the limit in the hope that they could enroll a city planning class that was half white and half nonwhite. They flouted financial aid limitations in order to push the university to adequately fund minority students.

University officials wary of such activist moves stressed the importance of bureaucratic process and their concern that its strictures were about to be transgressed (see Figure 2). Yale’s provost, Charles H. Taylor, sent a letter to School of Art and Architecture Dean Weaver on April 29 indicating his “surprise to learn of the proposals concerning admission and financial aid.” He admonished Weaver that “you are responsible . . . for establishing procedures in the School which assure the admission of fully qualified students” and reminded him to “[establish] procedures which will assure that the resources available to the School for student aid are not over-committed.” Despite these warnings, however, students effected their plan. On Thursday, May 22, the City Planning Forum informed twelve additional students of their acceptance into Yale’s city planning department. Each member of the City Planning Forum, including students and faculty, signed a letter—a distribution of responsibility that suggests their fear of punishment. Just two days later, their trepidation proved correct: on Saturday, Brewster asked Tunnard to resign as chair of the Department of City Planning; on Sunday, he removed Assistant Dean Louis DeLuca from his position at the School of Art and Architecture. The following day, Brewster alerted Harry Wexler and Pat Goeters that he would not renew their contracts upon completion of their terms. In just a few days, Brewster had essentially dismantled Yale’s Department of
City Planning, promising in a letter to the School of Art and Architecture on May 26 that “several events this spring” necessitated a fundamental reappraisal of the school. Of this endeavor he noted, surely with great calculation, that “most important, of course, will be the thoughts of the respective faculties.” And as for students, who had profoundly questioned the university’s processes throughout the spring and experimented with new approaches to pedagogy and authority? Brewster would “tap” their opinions—“in an orderly way.”93
Planning’s End?

While the rapid unfolding of events in the spring of 1969 suggests a quick end, city planning’s death at Yale came gradually. The department continued into the 1969–1970 school year, with Tunnard, DeLuca, Wexler, and Goeters still on the faculty. In September 1969, Brewster introduced major structural changes that divided art and design into two fully separate faculties, demoted former chair Tunnard to director of studies in planning, and installed a recent Yale Law School graduate and future U.S. Senator named Joseph Lieberman as assistant dean. Seven of the twelve students that the Forum had admitted in May attended Yale’s Department of City Planning as “special students.” School administrators were already discussing their conversion to degree candidates at the beginning of their first year, an ironic fact suggesting the turmoil in which the department still found itself. As a committee led by economist James Meyer assessed the future of urban studies at the university throughout the year, city planning faculty viewed their ultimate fate as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, as faculty member Alexander Garvin noted in a letter to Tunnard, who served on the Meyer Committee, “I was rather disturbed by the tone of my meeting . . . with the Meyer Committee. I had the singular impression that most of the members of your committee had either decided that the [sic] city planning was not a discipline or that it had no part in an urban studies program.”

Garvin may have been surprised to learn that the Meyer Committee found a future for city planning at Yale even as it acknowledged the existential crisis in which the discipline found itself. As issued in March 1970, the committee’s report noted that Yale’s department was just one among many nationwide that found itself in turmoil and targeted the department’s size and lack of clear relations with other disciplines as its major weaknesses. “Feelings of inadequacy about City Planning, at Yale as elsewhere,” the reported stated, “largely derive from the fact that as a profession, it is ill-defined and in a state of rapid (and somewhat confused) transition.”

Indeed, Yale could count Harvard as a kindred spirit. In the 1969–1970 school year, Harvard’s Graduate School of Design roiled in the aftermath of the June 1969 dismissal of radical planner Chester Hartman. He, like his former Yale colleagues, had campaigned against his city planning department’s lack of minority representation and had organized a community-oriented outreach program, the Urban Field Service, not unlike Yale’s Black Workshop.

Despite the Meyer Committee’s contextualization of Yale’s crisis, however, Brewster seemed unpersuaded. As he subsequently reviewed the report at length with the committee, and named yet another ad hoc committee to review the recommendations of the first, he appeared unbowed in his condemnation of the professional degree in the Department of City Planning. “I told the Corporation that the discussions . . . make me very dubious about the wisdom of concentrating Yale’s resources on the study of the City at the Masters level,” he wrote to administrative leaders in the architecture program in October 1970. In December, he finally ended the program, calling it “a matter of priorities.” The university found itself in tight fiscal constraints, he claimed, and the Department of City Planning itself was underfunded because “of the inadequate resources which had been devoted to [it].” Brewster’s failure to note that university administrators had supplied those “inadequate resources,” and his refusal to provide the additional $240,000 he estimated would be necessary for the department’s endurance suggests that budget was a convenient excuse for a predetermined fate.

Yet even despite Brewster’s seeming determination to end city planning amid recommendations to the contrary, it would be wrong to conclude that he was motivated by a desire to repress the increasing activism within the program over the course of the late 1960s. In principle, Brewster did not object to students’ opposition to modernist redevelopment, nor to their defense of the communities affected by urban renewal. Indeed, he had tolerated, even endorsed, the increasing role of advocacy planning in the School of Art and Architecture. Such a transformation was
acceptable because it retained the authority of the professional, just as vocal student dissent was acceptable so long as it still occurred within the framework of the educational process. But Brewster would no longer tolerate dissent once it transgressed the bureaucratic procedure of the liberal order, which was precisely the usurpation enacted by the City Planning Forum and the Black Workshop. Brewster spelled this out in the baccalaureate address he delivered on June 8, 1969, just days after the denouement of the crisis in the Department of City Planning: “What holds this faith in the academic process is the confidence that the case must be made—for admission, for the award of a degree, for professorial appointment—by a standard which, however fallible, speaks in terms of the objective qualities of promise and performance,” he said. “If this were to be lost or cavalierly trifled with, we would run the risk of lapsing into a group of parochial bands, a sort of group of intellectual vigilantes, furthering a single creed at best.”

Brewster’s defense of process was also a defense of professionalism, a category under direct attack by design students who hoped to put planning in the hands of the community itself, to shape the direction of university expansion, and to become the administrators of their own education. Yale’s liberal president did not oppose student input, but he did oppose the passing of disciplines out of the hands of experts. In a time of profound disciplinary crisis, Brewster stood against the dissipation of the professions, design included. Such a tension became clear in a letter he wrote in April 1969 stating his policies toward student activism: “We have not only protected but we have encouraged controversy and have indulged dissent no matter how extreme, whether by students, faculty, or visitors,” he wrote. But, he hedged,

I am increasingly aware that there has to be some protection of professional legal, financial, and architectural advisors against being second-guessed by amateurs and neophyte professionals. . . . Those most directly affected by an action based on professional advice should have a chance to make their views and interests known, not as professional advisors but as parties directly affected.

There was a place for those critics who would question professional expertise, especially those affected by that expertise. But those “amateurs” must remain subordinate to professionals, who in Brewster’s eyes maintained the position of primary authority.

If the irony in radical design students’ anarchistic vision was that they pictured a world without professional expertise, including their own, then the equal irony in Brewster’s action against the Department of City Planning was that in responding to an attack against the liberal order by closing rank, he effectively delegitimized the very profession he hoped to save. City planning found itself in a professional crisis in the late 1960s, as students reacted against liberal orthodoxy. In the new order they proposed, the professional played a role equal to that of the planner for, if he or she played any role at all. But in destroying Yale’s professional program in city planning, Brewster only pitched the profession into greater turmoil. Students lost not only a center of planning education but a platform too, one from which they had waged a campaign against the New Deal spatial order that resounded in the halls of A & A, in New Haven’s neighborhoods, and across the disciplines of architecture and city planning. Brewster, in turn, lost his voice in the discourse of the profession. Once he had dismantled the Department of City Planning, Yale could no longer train future planners. With planning’s end, the debate that raged at Yale over the future of the profession came to an abrupt—and unresolved—conclusion.

Yet the field of planning did not in fact end. Indeed, even as it suffered existential crises—with none perhaps as dramatic as that at Yale—the discipline grew rapidly nationwide. By the mid-1970s, fifteen times more students received masters’ degrees in planning than just twenty years earlier. The number of planning programs multiplied too, so that most major universities trained professional planners by the late 1970s. When Yale’s final class of planning students entered the
profession in the early 1970s, they found that their discipline was very much alive. Indeed, they discovered an order of urban redevelopment much like that they had envisioned in the halls of A & A during the crucial final years of the 1960s. Community development corporations and community design centers grew in America’s inner cities, Community Development Block Grants brought federal redevelopment funding to the local level, and the myriad styles of architectural postmodernism offered a dramatic alternative to the modernism of the New Deal spatial order. Urban renewal had ceded to “neighborhoodism,” an approach characterized by its small scale and grassroots foundation. But beneath the surface, this reality was not quite as students had anticipated. Despite radical roots, neighborhoodism resonated equally well among those on the political right who promoted small government, fiscal austerity, and the exclusionary power of local control. Community development corporations marked neighborhood empowerment but also the broader retrenchment of federal aid to cities. Postmodernism developed stylistic excesses that rivaled those of its predecessor. And with fewer public jobs available, many young planners were forced into the private sector, where they pursued market-driven development unrelated to the larger social concerns of the previous decade.105 Activist design students at Yale and similar universities did indeed shift urban redevelopment in the late 1960s, but the changes they realized hardly matched their deepest aspirations. Planning in the 1970s lacked the vision of social justice, the core of activism, and the radical promise to which students had aspired. Though they had helped topple the dominant New Deal spatial order, the city that emerged in its place remained far from their ideal.

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Notes
3. Memo to the Yale Community from Kingman Brewster, April 9, 1968, Kingman Brewster, Jr., president of Yale University, Records, record unit 11, box 45, folder 3, Sterling Memorial Library (SML), Yale University, New Haven, CT (hereinafter cited as Brewster Records).
5. I use “New Deal spatial order” after the “New Deal Order” characterized by Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle. See Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980


9. On factors that brought the end of the New Deal order, see Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, “Introduction,” in Fraser and Gerstle, Rise and Fall, xviii.


13. For this dichotomy, see Mollenkopf, Contested City. On growth coalitions, also see Teaford, Rough Road to Renaissance; Fainstein et al., Restructuring the City; Lizabeth Cohen, “Buying into Downtown Revival: The Centrality of Retail to Postwar Urban Renewal in American Cities,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 611 (May 2007): 82-95.


16. On the “failure” of the New Left, see Rossinow, Politics of Authenticity; Isserman and Kazin, “Failure and Success.”

20. For a comprehensive account of the clearance and redevelopment of the Oak Street neighborhood, see Jackson, Model City Blues, 28-51; also see Fainstein and Fainstein, “New Haven,” 40-41.
32. For a full narrative of organizing in the Hill neighborhood, see Jackson, Model City Blues, 80-113.
33. Ibid., 84-86.
34. Kabaservice, Guardians, 224-25.
38. “Bulletin of Yale University School of Architecture, 1972–73” (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1972), SML.
40. “Bulletin of Yale University School of Art and Architecture” (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1962), SML.

46. On Davidoff and curricular changes at the University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Fine Arts, see Klemek, “Urbanism as Reform,” 216-27.


49. On Brewster’s role in the “liberal establishment,” his approach to liberalism, and the others with whom he associated, see Kabaservice, *Guardians*.


57. “Statement Read to the New England Area AIA Conference.”
66. See Self, American Babylon, 177-255.
67. For instance, Goeters writes, “[Davidoff’s] concept seems to us to be in the ‘white caretaker’ tradition. He is relentlessly objective, dispassionate, uninvolved, detached from the ‘clients’ he advocates for. He seems to share the traditional patrician attitude that ‘we know what’s best for you.’” See Goeters, “Patrician Hangup,” 48.
69. Letter to Brewster from Short and Ibel, January 5, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 1, SML.
71. Letter to Charles Taylor from E. W. Y. Dunn, Jr., January 31, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 1, SML.
72. Yale University News Bureau, News Release, February 3, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 1, SML, emphasis added.
74. Black Workshop, “Raison d’Etre,” February 19, 1969[?], Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 6, SML.
77. Black Workshop, “Raison d’Etre.”
78. Ibid.
79. These projects took place in May and February 1969, respectively. See Black Workshop, “Recommendations of Faculties of Design and Planning,” June 1969[?], Brewster Papers, box 27, folder 4, SML.
80. Letter to Howard Weaver from Black Workshop, May 12, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 6, SML. Also see Letter to Black Workshop from Weaver, May 7, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 6, SML.
87. “Rules and Bylaws of the Yale City Planning Department,” April 14, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 9, SML.
88. “Disbanding of the Department,” *Novum Organum* 8 (1969); Letter to Weaver from Black Workshop, April 29, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 6, SML.
89. “Disbanding of the Department.” The protests over insufficient financial aid for students studying art, design, and drama that had been a major focus of activism throughout the spring undoubtedly informed the City Planning Forum’s actions. See Warren, “A & A Students Camp Out”; Warren, “Brewster to Face A & A Demands.”
90. Letter to Weaver from Taylor, April 29, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 1, SML.
91. Letter to 12 Candidates from the City Planning Forum, May 22, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 27, folder 8, SML; Goeters, interview. For Weaver’s accounting of events, see Letter to the Faculty and Students in the Department of City Planning from Weaver, May 26, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 27, folder 8, SML.
92. “Disbanding of the Department.”
93. Memo to Faculty and Students, School of Art and Architecture from Brewster, May 26, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 2, SML. The Art and Architecture Building suffered a devastating fire just two
weeks after the debacle in the Department of City Planning, a coincidence that only heightened the fever pitch of this era in the School of Art and Architecture. New Haven’s fire marshal ultimately found no evidence suggesting that arson was the cause. See Thomas F. Lyden, Jr., Fire Marshal, “A & A Building, June 14, 1969 [Marshal’s report],” Brewster papers, box 27, folder 1, SML. Also see McDonough, “Surface as Stake”; Perspecta 29 (1998).


95. Memo to Moore from Weaver, September 24, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 2, SML; Memo to Tunnard from Lieberman, February 19, 1970, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 3, SML.

96. Letter to Tunnard from Garvin, November 10, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 26, folder 9, SML.

97. “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Urban Studies at Yale,” 2-4, 12, Brewster Papers, box 297, folder 1, SML.


100. Brewster, “Memorandum Re: City Planning (draft),” December 7, 1970, Brewster Papers, box 27, folder 3, SML.

101. Such an explanation is found, for instance, in “Introduction,” Perspecta 29 (1998): xv. The authors write, “For the planners, such a stunningly disproportionate reaction only confirmed their suspicion that the administration was using the issue of admissions as a pretext to terminate the advocacy work towards which both university and school had long been hostile.”


103. Letter to John Perry Miller from Brewster, April 6, 1969, Brewster Papers, box 320, folder 5, SML.


Bio

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